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Abstract 
Many countries experienced a remarkable increase in life expectancy during the 20th 
century, but the development implications have received only modest attention. We 
analyze steady state and out-of-steady-state effects of the transition in adult longevity on 
the national saving rate using an overlapping generations model. We show that the 
national saving rate depends on both the level and rate of change in adult survival. 
Countries with rapid transitions have particularly elevated saving rates. Empirical 
evidence is drawn from two sources:  long-term historical trends for a small number of 
countries and world panel data for 1960-95.  Two important conclusions are supported 
by the empirical analysis.  First, the demographic transition had a large positive effect 
on aggregate saving, but over three-quarters of the gain was due to improvements in 
old-age survival rather than declines in youth dependency.  Second, population aging 
will not lead to a decline in aggregate saving rates.  The compositional effect – lower   2
saving rates among the elderly – is dominated by the behavioral effect – individuals will 
save more to provide for a longer old age.     
1.Introduction  
 
One of the most salient features of modern economic development is the increase in 
wealth and capital.  In the US, for example, GDP grew at annual rate of 3.6 percent 
between 1820 and 1992.  By comparison, the non-residential capital stock grew at an 
annual rate of 5.0 percent.  As a result, the ratio of non-residential capital stock to GDP 
increased by twelve-fold.  The experience of the UK, with a thirteen-fold increase 
between 1820 and 1992, was similar.  Over a considerably shorter period, 1890 to 
1992, Japan’s capital-output ratio increased eleven-fold increase and, in the process, 
passed the US (Maddison 1995).  The extraordinary growth in wealth and capital was 
repeated, in a more condensed form, in the Newly Industrializing Economies.  High 
rates of saving and investment in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and several other 
Asian countries has led to rapid capital deepening.   
  Why did this occur?  The demand side undoubtedly played an important role.  
Technological innovation led to new and better equipment and machinery.  Structural 
change led to industrialization and the growth of the manufacturing and service sectors 
with accompanying investment.  The possibility explored in this study, however, is 
that the modern rise in wealth was driven in large part by an important supply side 
factor – the rise in adult mortality.   
  The proportion of adult life lived after age 60 began to increase steadily in the 
West in the late 19
th Century.  I n other parts of the world increases began much later – 
in the middle of the 20
th Century.  Retirement emerged as a significant feature of the 
lifecycle creating a powerful saving incentive.  Institutional responses, the emergence 
of funded employment-based pension plans, the rise of the commercial financial service 
sector, the creation of tax incentives, and, in some countries, the establishment of 
funded public retirement systems, reinforced the effects of increased longevity.  Other 
responses, particularly the creation of transfer-based public pension programs in Latin 
America, Europe, and to a lesser extent in Japan and the US, undoubtedly  undermined 
the incentive effects of a longer life span. 
  That rising life expectancy leads to higher saving is not a new idea.  Yaari’s 
(1965) seminal work established the micro-level theoretical foundation.  Since then 
other scholars have explored the aggregate effects using steady-state models and 
simulation analysis.  Previous empirical work supports the existence of an important   3
link between saving and life expectancy (Bloom and others, 2003; Borsch-Supan, 1996; 
Cutler and others, 1990; Davies, 1981; Kageyama, 2003; Kuehlwein, 1993; Leung, 
1994; Schieber and others, 1996; Yaari, 1965; Zilcha and others, 1985).   
  The theoretical analysis described briefly in Section 2 employs an overlapping 
generations model which extends previous work to a dynamic context.  A unique 
implication of the model is that the aggregate saving rate is influenced by both the level 
and the rate of change of adult life expectancy.  Given the current level of mortality, 
countries experiencing rapid mortality transitions will have higher saving rates.  The 
underlying logic behind this result is straight-forward.  If a rapid mortality transition 
country is playing catch-up, for example, the wealth required to support a longer 
retirement must be accumulated over a shorter period of time.  Thus, saving rates must 
be elevated during the catch-up period.   
The empirical analysis relies on two different approaches.  Section 3 takes an 
historical perspective by looking at data for seven countries for which we can track 
saving and mortality trends over all or a substantial part of the entire demographic 
transition.  In the sub-group of Western countries, adult life expectancy changed very 
slowly or not at all until the middle or end of the 19
th Century.  Thereafter, life 
expectancy changed at a pace that was remarkably constant and varied little from one 
country to the next.  The sub-group of Asian countries began their mortality transitions 
later, went through a catch-up period when adult longevity increased rapidly, followed 
by a period of steady increase at a rate similar to that found in the West.   
The difference in the demographic transitions between the West and East Asia 
offers a useful opportunity to compare the implications of our theoretical model with the 
experiences of these two groups of countries.  Some of the idiosyncratic features of the 
saving trends are not explained by our model, but there is broad consistency.  The 
increase in adult mortality was accompanied by a rise in aggregate saving rates in most 
countries.  Rapid mortality transition was clearly accompanied by elevated saving 
rates.    
 In Section 4, we estimate the saving model using aggregate cross-national data.  
The evidence is consistent and robust in its support of the hypothesis that an increase in 
old-age survival leads to higher saving rates.  In a sub-sample consisting of Western 
and East Asian countries, the rate of increase in old-age survival also has a positive 
effect on saving.  In other parts of the developing world, however, we do not find 
evidence that the rate of change in old-age survival has an effect on saving.  Why 
different patterns persist is an issue requiring further exploration.     4
Two additional features of the analysis are important.  First, several recent 
studies conclude that changes in age structure, especially the decline in the youth 
dependency ratio, accounted for high saving rates especially in East Asia (Higgins and 
others, 1997; Kelley and others, 1996).  Simulation studies (Lee and others, 2000; 
2001a; 2001b) and empirical work based on household survey data (Deaton and Paxson, 
2000) ascribe a substantially less important role for age structure.  The empirical 
analysis presented here offers some reconciliation of these views.  Once we control for 
adult life expectancy and its rate of change, the youth dependency ratio has a smaller 
effect than previously estimated.  The decline in youth dependency accounts for about 
one-quarter of the increase in saving rates in East Asia, while changes in adult survival 
account for about three-quarters of the increase.   
Second, while some studies conclude that population aging will lead to 
substantial declines in aggregate saving rates, we do not find this to be the case.  So 
long as adult mortality continues to rise – as it has for many decades – will not drive 
saving rates lower. 
2. The Theory
1 
Changes in adult survival influence aggregate saving in two ways in the lifecycle model 
employed here.  First, there is a behavioral effect.  The expected duration of 
retirement rises as the survival rate increases.  Thus, individuals will consume less and 
save more during their working years in order to support more expected years of 
consumption and greater dis-saving during retirement.  Second, there is a 
compositional effect as increases in the adult survival rate lead to an increase in the 
share of retirees in the adult population.  Given that retirees are saving at a lower rate 
than workers, the compositional effect of an increase in adult survival is to reduce 
aggregate saving. 
The net effect on saving is considered in steady-state and in dynamic settings.  
We approach the dynamics in two ways, first, by considering the effect of a one-time 
increase in survival and, second, by considering the effect of continuing increases in 
survival rates.  As is shown in the empirical section, considering these alternatives 
brings a clearer understanding of how the mortality transition – as it is actually evolving 
– will influence aggregate saving rates. 
Consider a population consisting of two generations of adults. Each person lives 
for up to two periods – the first period as a working, prime-age adult and the second 
period as a retiree. All individuals survive their working period, and qt survive to the 
                                                  
1 Theoretical results are summarized here.  More details are available in Kinugasa, 2004.   5
end of their retirement period.  The remaining members of the population (1-qt) die at 
the end of the first period of life. Thus, qt is the probability of reaching retirement age, 
the expected years lived during retirement, and the ratio of retirement years to working 
years for the average member of the population.  Individuals cannot foresee whether 
they will survive, but they know the value of qt for the population. Costless annuities are 
available so that individuals protect themselves against longevity risk by purchasing an 
annuity. Individuals know the interest rate that the annuity will pay.   
  The consumer’s optimization problem is to maximize lifetime utility, assuming 



























; c1,t is consumption while a prime-age adult and   
c2,t+1 is consumption while elderly ; d is the discount factor, defined as d=1/(1+?), where 
? is the discount rate; 1/? is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution; rt+1 is the interest 
rate; At is labor-augmenting technology; and wt is the wage per unit of effective labor.  
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where  ? t is the share in wage income of saving by prime-age adults.  An increase in 
the adult survival rate has an unambiguous positive effect on  ? t and, hence, on per 
capita saving by prime age adults.  An increase in the adult survival rate has an 
unambiguous negative effect on per capita saving by retirees.  The response of the 
combined saving of workers and retirees to changes in survival depends on additional 
features of the macro-economy to which we now turn. 
Gross domestic product (Yt) is produced by a Cobb-Douglas production function 
with labor-augmenting technological growth, i.e., 
1
ttt YKL
ff - = , where  f is the share 
of capital in GDP,  01 f << .  L t=AtN1,t is the aggregate labor supply measured in 
efficiency units.    N1,t is the population of prime-age adults and At is the technology 
index.  The population growth rate per generation is n-1 and, hence,  2,1, /. tt NNn =    6
The technological growth rate per generation is g-1.   Hence, the relationship between 
the total lifetime labor income of prime-age adults and pensioners is given by 
112,1, / tttttt wANwANgn -- = .    Using lower case letters to represent quantities per unit of 
effective worker, output per effective worker is  tt yk
f =  and the capital-output ratio is 
1
t k
f - .  The depreciation rate (x) is assumed to be constant; hence, depreciation as a 





Total gross national saving is the sum of the saving of adults (S1,t), the saving of 
the elderly (S 2,t) and depreciation (?Kt).  Dividing by  t Y  yields the gross national 

















  (2) 
The term  (1) f -  is the share of labor income in GNP,  (,) ttt qk Y  is saving by current 
workers as a share of current labor income,  11
1
(,) -- -Y tt qk
gn
 is saving by current 




-  is depreciation as a share of 
current GNP.   
Steady-state Rate of Growth Effects 
The steady-state gross national saving rate is:   
 
*
***1 1 (1)(,) Sgn qkk
Ygn
f fx
- ￿￿ - ￿￿ =-Y+ ￿￿ ￿￿ Łł Łł
  (3) 
where the * superscript denotes equilibrium values.  Standard and well-known 
implications of the lifecycle model (Modigliani and others, 1954) follow directly from 
equation (3). First, the net saving rate is zero if the economy is not growing (gn=1).  
Second, the partial effect of an increase in the GDP growth rate is equal to the mean age 
of earning less the mean age of consumption, as in the variable rate-of-growth model 
(Mason (1981,1987) and Fry and Mason (1982)),.  As shown in Kinugasa, ?  is the 
difference between the mean ages consumption and earning.
2   
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The Effect of Adult Survival in Steady-State and in Transition 
The effect of changes in adult survival on saving depends on whether or not the 
capital-labor ratio and interest rates are endogenous.  In a small open economy, the 
equilibrium capital-labor ratio and interest rates are determined by global economic 
conditions.  A rise in domestic saving – and factors that influence the saving rate – will 
have no effect on domestic investment nor on domestic interest rates.  In a closed 
economy, however, saving and investment are equal and the rate of interest is 
endogenously determined by the interplay of the supply of capital by households and 
the demand for capital by firms.  The effect on saving of an increase in adult survival 
in each of these environments is considered in turn.  
Saving in a Small Open Economy 
The effect of an increase in adult survival on the steady state saving rate in a small open 
economy depends on the rate of growth of income.  If the economy is growing, gn>1, 
the steady state saving rate rises with adult survival.  In an economy with negative 
economic growth, the steady state saving rate declines with an increase in adult 
survival.  The steady state saving rate given by equation  (3) holds with 
* k  
exogenously determined.  An increase in adult survival leads to a rise in the share of 
labor income saved by prime age adults, i.e.,  ** /0 q ¶Y¶> , but the dis-saving by 
retirees increases, as well.  In a growing economy, the increase in saving by prime age 
adults dominates the decline in saving by retirees and the aggregate saving rate rises 
with adult survival.  In a declining economy, the decline in saving by retirees 
dominates and the aggregate saving rate declines as adult survival rises. 
The response of saving rates in a dynamic context is more complex.  Consider a 
small open economy that is in equilibrium, but experiences and increase in the survival 
rate in period t.    Prime age adults respond by increasing their saving rates, while 
saving by retirees is unaffected.  The aggregate saving rate must rise in period t.  The 
transitory increase in saving is independent of the rate of economic growth gn.  In 
period t+1, dis-saving by retirees rise and the aggregate saving rate declines.  In the 
absence of further changes in survival, a new equilibrium saving rate is established in 
period t+1.  As shown above, the new equilibrium depends on the rate of economic 
growth.  In a growing economy, it will be higher than the rate of saving in period t-1, 
but lower than saving in period t. 
                                                                                                                                                  
2 In this model, the mean age of consumption is  1,2,11,2,1 (2)/() ++ ++ tttttt cqccqc  and the 
mean age of earning is 1.   8
Saving in a Closed Economy 
In a closed economy, an increase in the saving rate leads to greater investment, capital 
deepening, more rapid growth in wages, and a decline in the interest rate.  The supply 
of capital follows directly from the saving model presented above, because the capital 
stock in period t+1 is equal to total saving by prime-age adults in period t.  Expressed 
as capital per effective worker, the supply of capital in year t+1 depends on the wage 
per effective worker in year t, the share of that wage that is saved by prime-age adults, 














S ,                  (4) 
where  t S   is the supply function of capital. The effect of the interest rate on the supply 
of capital is ambiguous.
3  The wage is equal to the marginal product of an effective 
worker,  ()'() tttt wfkkfk =-  and is increasing in capital per effective worker.  An 
increase in the survival rate leads to an increase in the share of labor income saved by 
prime-age adults and, hence, capital per effective worker and the supply of capital.   
The demand for capital, D, is governed by the marginal condition that the cost of 
capital equals the net return, i.e.,  11 '() tt rfk x ++ =- .  That f’’<0 implies that the 
demand curve is downward sloping.   The demand for capital is independent of the 
survival rate. 
The effect of an increase in the survival rate from q
* to q’ in period 1 is traced in 
Figure 1.  The demand curve, DD, is unaffected.  Workers in period 1 increase their 
saving because in period 2 they expect to live longer and, perhaps, because they expect 
lower interest rates to depress the rate of return on annuities.  Thus, the supply curve, 
SS, shifts to the right in period 2.  This leads to a rise in capital per worker and wages 
for the new generation of workers.  As a result, the saving function shifts further to the 
right, in part, because of the expected further decline in interest rates.  The process 
continues until a new equilibrium is established.
4 Unless the decline in interest rates 
leads to a substantial reduction in saving by prime-age adults – a possibility not born out 
by empirical research – an increase in adult survival in period t leads to capital 
deepening. 
The effect of survival on aggregate is readily inferred from its effect on capital per 
                                                  
3  In the simulation results presented below we assume that an increase in the interest rate leads to 
greater saving.  Qualitative results hold unless an increa se in interest rates have a large negative effect on 
saving – a possibility not supported by empirical evidence.  For details see Kinugasa 2004. 
4  The economy converges in a non-oscillatory pattern to the steady state under plausible parameter 
values. See Kinugasa (2004) for details.   9
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  (6) 
From inspection of equation (6) an increase in the equilibrium capital-labor ratio and, 
hence, the capital-output ratio (
1 k
f -
), leads to an increase in the equilibrium net saving 
rate ( *1 (1) gnk
f - - ) in a growing economy.  The gross saving rate increases if the 
depreciation rate plus the rate of growth is po sitive. 
  During transition, as is clear from equation  (5), the saving rate is elevated above 
the equilibrium level depending on the rate of capital deepening ( 1 / tt kk + ). As with the 
open economy case, a one-shot increase in the survival rate leads to a large increase in 
the saving rate for one generation followed by a decline in the saving rate to a 
steady-state level as a new equilibrium is established.  In an economy with positive 
labor-augmenting growth, the net saving rate will be higher than in the initial 
equilibrium, but lower than during the transition period.     
Simulation Results 
Figure 2 compares the simulated saving rates in a small open economy and a closed 
economy produced by an increase in adult survival from 0.4 in year t-1 to 0.5 in year t.
5 
The initial impact is large in both cases.  The response is somewhat muted in the 
closed economy because the declines in interest rates lead to reduced saving rates 
among prime-age adults.  A new equilibrium is established in period t+1 in the open 
economy, but the adjustment is more gradual in the closed economy as described above.  
The equilibrium saving rate in the closed economy is greater than in the open economy, 
because of capital deepening in the closed economy.  Higher net saving is required to 
sustain a higher capital-output ratio.  Greater depreciation leads to an increase in gross 
saving beyond the increase in net saving.   
                                                  
. 
5 Each period consists of 30 years.  We assume that population growth and 
productivity growth are both 1.5 percent per year implying values of n=g=1.563. The 
discount rate is 0.811, intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 1.3, and depreciation 
rate is 0.785. The elasticity of output with respect to capital is 1/3.   Kinugasa (2004) 
provides additional details.   10
One would not be likely to observe the simulated saving paths shown in Figure 2.   
Adult survival rates trend upward at a relatively constant rate in many countries – as we 
will show below.  Figure 3 presents simulated saving rates assuming that adult survival 
increases by 0.1 per period starting from 0.4 in year t-1.  Otherwise, parameters are 
identical to those employed in the simulations presented in Figure 2.  The onset of 
adult mortality decline leads to a secular rise in saving rates that continues as long as 
adult survival rates continue to increase.  Saving rates appear to be very nearly linear 
in adult survival after period t-1 in the open economy case and after period t in the 
closed economy case.   
3. Historical Perspectives on Old-Age Survival and Saving 
The modern mortality transition began in the West.  Early gains were concentrated at 
young ages, but by 1900 old-age survival rates were rising steadily in Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, Italy, and the US – the four Western countries we examine below.  
The mortality transition began much later outside of the West.  The three Asian 
populations for which we have relatively complete historical data – Japan, Taiwan, and 
India – did not experience significant gains in old-age survival until the middle of the 
20
th Century.  When the mortality transition began, however, it was very rapid as these 
Asian countries caught or, in the case of Japan, surpassed the West.   
Historical mortality transitions are of great interest here because of their 
implications for long-run trends in national saving rates.  Previous empirical research – 
and the analysis presented in Section 4 – relies on data that cover a relatively small 
portion of the mortality transition.  This is unfortunate given the long-term nature of 
the processes under consideration.  The distinctive experiences of Asia with the West, 
however, provide an opportunity to assess long-term effects of mortality change on 
saving. 
We begin with an examination of the mortality transitions of seven countries.  
In six of the countries – all but India – we are able to construct an old-age survival 
index (q) that is also used in Section 4.
6  The old-age survival index is the expected 
years lived after age 60 per expected year lived between the ages of 30 and 60 given the 
age specific death rates observed during the year of observation. The value of q ranges 
from less than 0.2 expected years lived after age 60 per expected year lived between the 
ages of 30 and 60 in Taiwan circa 1900 to close to 0.8 in current day Japan.   
                                                  
6 In India we analyze life expectancy at age 30, which is highly correlated with the old-age survival 
index.    11
Historical data for Sweden allows us to trace the transition in old-age survival 
from the mid-18
th Century.  The 250 years of data can be described remarkably well as 
consisting of a pre-transition period during which old-age survival was virtually 
stagnant and a transition period during which old-age survival increased steadily .  In 
1751 adults could expect to live about one-third of a year after age 60 for every year 
lived between the ages of 30 and 60. Between 1761 and 1876 the old-age survival index 
increased at an annual rate of only 0.0006.  Between 1876 and 2001 the old-age 
survival index increased four times as rapidly - at an annual rate of 0.0026.  Allowing 
for three short-run mortality crises – famine in 1772-73, the Finnish War in 1808-09, 
and the Spanish flu epidemic of 1918 – a piece-wise linear regression with one 
break-point at 1876 explains 93 percent of the variance in adult mortality (Table 1).
7 
 
Table 1. Structural Changes of the Old-Age Survival Index.  About here. 
 
  The old-age survival transitions of the three other Western countries can be 
characterized in equally simple fashion.  For the United Kingdom, old-age survival 
increased at an annual rate of 0.0009 between 1841 and 1900 and at a rate of 0.0024 
between 1900 and 1998, with 96 percent of the variance explained by the piece-wise 
linear model with a single break point.  The available data for Italy and the United 
States do not extend into the pre-transition period.  Old-age survival in Italy from 1872 
to 2000 and in the United States from 1900 to 2001 can be explained as consisting of a 
single transition period with old-age survival increasing by 0.0029 years per year in 
Italy and by 0.0033 years per year in the United States.   
That the gains in these four countries have been remarkably constant during the 
20
th Century has important – and unfortunate – implications for testing the dynamic 
saving model.  In the absence of time series variation in the rate at which old-age 
survival is increasing, estimates of the effect of the rate of change in old-age survival 
will depend entirely on cross-country differences.  Even though there are small 
year-to-year fluctuations and instances of more significant fluctuations, e.g., the flu 
epidemic of 1918, short-term fluctuations may have little or no effect on long-term 
expectations.  In our model, it is long-term expectations that matter.  To add to the 
difficulties, the cross-national differences among the four Western countries are quite 
modest. The historical experience of the West is useful to the extent that we explore the 
                                                  
7 The break points were assigned visually.  A more precise iterative approach would improve the fit 
of the piece -wise linear approximations, but the analysis presented below would not be affected in any 
important way. . 
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effect on saving of the shift from pre-transition to transition.  We return to this issue 
below.   
  The mortality experience in East Asia is quite distinctive judging from the 
relatively complete data for Japan and Taiwan.  Their pre-transition periods lasted until 
much later, but were followed by a significant catch-up period during which old-age 
survival increased quite rapidly.  Having closed the mortality gap with the West, the 
gains in adult mortality have slowed.  Recent mortality gains in Taiwan are similar to 
those found in the West while Japan continues to experience larger gains in old-age 
survival (Table 1).   
  Indian life expectancy at age 30 also increased very gradually until 1951.  For 
the next forty years substantial gains were achieved.  The 1990s saw a marked 
slow-down.  The pattern is similar to that found in Japan and Taiwan although direct 
comparison is not possible. 
  To what extent are the saving trends in these six countries consistent with the 
predictions of our saving model?  Three implications of the model can be examined.  
First, prior to the transition in old-age survival, saving rates would have been relatively 
low.  Second, constant increases in old-age survival during the transition would have 
produced relatively constant increases in saving rates.  Third, East Asian countries 
would have experienced relatively elevated saving rates during their period of rapid 
transition.  Of course, these patterns would consistently emerge only if the trends in 
old-age survival dominated other factors. 
First, were pre-transition saving rates low?  Estimates for five countries are 
available and presented in Table 2.  In all cases, the pre-transition saving rates are low 
as compared with the saving rates that followed, but the UK saving rate during 
pre-transition is only slightly less than its transition saving rate and Taiwan’s 
pre-transition saving rate is quite high as compared with the other countries.    
 
Table 2 Mean National Saving Rates in Pre-Transition and Transition Periods.  
About here. 
  
  Second, are saving and old-age survival correlated?  The observed saving 
rates are plotted against the observed survival values in Figure 4 for each of the 
countries.  The US stands out as an exception with a negative simple correlation 
between saving rates and old-age survival.  In the United Kingdom, the positive 
correlation is modest (0.37).  In the other five countries, the correlation between the 
two variables ranges from 0.64 upward.     13
 The third question is whether rapid changes in survival rates (observed mostly 
in the countries of East Asia) were associated with higher saving rates.  As a simple 
analytic device we compare the six countries at three benchmark old-age survival rates 
– 0.4, 0.5, and 0.6 – observed for the six countries for which we have values (Figure 5).  
There is a clear positive association between the national saving rate and the change in 
the old-age survival rates over the subsequent decade.  The simple correlation between 
the variables ranges from 0.58 to 0.72.  The effects are essentially identical for q equal 
to 0.4 and 0.5 and somewhat attenuated for 0.6.  These results provide modest but 
consistent support for the dynamic model of adult survival and saving. 
 
4. Analys is of World Panel Data  1965-1995 
Estimates of national saving rates, life expectancy at birth, and other variables that may 
influence saving are available for 76 countries in 1965 increasing to 94 countries in 
1995.  In this section we present analysis of national saving rates employing these 
data.  Using the world panel data offers advantages over the historical analysis.  First, 
we can move to a multivariate framework that explicitly incorporates the role of other 
factors in determining national saving rates.  Second, we can explore whether the 
Western/East Asian distinctions drawn in the historical analysis can be generalized to 
other countries of the world.  There are also disadvantages that are discussed below.  
 
Model Specification 
The empirical model incorporates the two effects of old-age survival derived from the 
OLG model presented in Section 2:  the steady-state effect, which interacts with the 
rate of economic growth, and the transitory effect, which depends on the rate at which 
old-age survival is increasing.  The OLG model implies that both the steady-state 
effect ( 1 b ) and the transitory effect ( 2 b ) are positive in equation  (1):    
  012345 1 grtgrgrt SYqYqDYYPRI bbbbbbe =+￿+D+￿+++   (1) 
where S/Y is the national saving rate, q is the old-age survival index, Ygr is the growth 
rate of GDP, ? q is the change in the old-age survival index during the previous five 
year period, D1 is the youth dependency ratio, and PRI is the relative price of 
investment goods. 
The basic empirical model incorporates three other saving determinants that have 
been explored in previous studies.  The first is the effect of youth dependency.  As 
youth dependency varies over the demographic transition, aggregate saving can be 
influenced in a variety of ways of which two seem particularly important.  First, an   14
increase in the number of children may have a direct effect on current household 
consumption because of the costs of additional children.  The direction of the effect 
will depend, however, on whether or not a decline in the number of children is 
associated with a decline in total consumption by children.  If the price of children 
relative to adults is rising and the demand for children is price inelastic, expenditures on 
children will increase as the number of children declines.  In this instance, youth 
dependency would have a positive effect on saving.  If the demand for children is price 
elastic or if the number of children is changing for reasons unrelated to changes in 
relative prices, youth dependency will have a negative effect on saving (Mason 1987).    
Changes in youth dependency may also influence saving because children provide 
old-age support either through familial support systems or through public pension and 
health care systems.  To the extent that children are seen as a substitute for pension 
assets, youth dependency will have a negative effect on saving.  The specification of 
the youth dependency effect follows the variable rate-of-growth (VRG) model (Fry and 
Mason 1982; Mason 1981, 1987; Kelley and Schmidt 1996).  
The second effect included in the basic model is the rate-of-growth effect, that is a 
feature of the OLG model presented in Section 2 and life-cycle saving models in general 
(Modigliani and Brumberg 1954).  In an economy experiencing more rapid GDP 
growth, the lifetime earnings of young cohorts are greater relative to the lifetime 
earnings of older cohorts.  To the extent that lifecycle saving is used to shift resources 
from younger to older ages, saving is concentrated among younger cohorts.  Hence, 
the rate of growth effect is typically positive, but can in principle be negative.
8  The 
effect of GDP growth is variable, equal to 134  1 qD bbb ++ , because the old-age survival 
rate and the youth dependency ratio influence the life-cycle profile of consumption.  
The coefficient ß3 has no economic interpretation in isolation and, hence, may be 
positive or negative depending on the effects of q and D1.   
The third determinant included in the empirical model is the relative price of 
investment goods (PRI) following Taylor (1995) and Higgins and Williamson (1996, 
1997).  The PRI captures the effect of changing interest rates. An increase in the 
interest rate will lead to an increase or decrease in saving by prime-age adults and by the 
elderly depending on the relative strengths of the substitution and wealth effects. Thus, 
the effect of the PRI on the national saving rate is an empirical issue.   
A potentially important extension of the model, considered below, allows for a 
transitory youth dependency effects following Higgins (1994) and Williamson and 
                                                  
8 The saving mechanism can be used to shift consumption to younger ages, by accumulating credit 
card debt, for example, but constraints on indebtedness limit the importance of these transactions.     15
Higgins (2001).  A drop in youth dependency would induce prime age adults to save 
more during their working years in anticipation that they would rely less on familial or 
public transfers during their retirement years.  Current retirees would be unaffected as 
they are simply dis-saving the (small) assets they accumulated in the expectation that 
they would be supported by the many children they chose to bear.  Hence, aggregate 
saving would rise steeply.  In the next period, however, the higher saving by the new 
generation of prime age adults would be offset by the higher dis-saving by the new 
generation of retirees.  Hence, saving would decline from the transitory peak to a 
steady-state peak that would be higher than saving in period t, but lower than saving in 
period t+1.  Just as is the case for survival, the saving rate would depend on the current 
level of youth dependency and its rate of change.   
 
Variables, Definitions, the Sample, and Estimation Methods 
Except as noted below, all variables are taken directly from or constructed using data 
from the World Development Indicators (WDI 2003).  The saving rate ( / t SY ) is the 
average gross national saving rate for the five-year period t to t+5.  The rate of growth 
of income is measured by the real rate of growth of GDP during the preceding five-year 
period.  The relative price of investment goods ( t PRI ) is taken directly from the Penn 
World Table (PWT) and is the average value for the period t to t+5.  The youth 
dependency ratio ( 1t D ) is the ratio of the population 0-14 to the population 15-64.     
The old-age survival index (q) is the ratio of expected person years lived after 
age 60 ( 60 T ) to expected person years lived between ages 30 and 60 ( 3060 TT - ) given 
contemporaneous age-specific death rates.  Tx, total number of years lived after age x, 
is a standard life table value.  Life tables are not available for many countries in many 
years.  Hence, life expectancy at birth from the World Development Indicators (World 
Bank 200x) were used in conjunction with Coale-Demeny model life tables (Coale and 
Demeny 1983) to construct estimates of q.
9 The change in the old-age survival index is 
the average increase over the preceding five-year period, i.e.,  5. ttt qqq - D=-  
  The full sample consists of 566 observations for 76 countries in 1965 
increasing to 94 countries in 1995.  Estimates for Western and East Asian countries 
and for Other Developing Countries are presented separately.  Sample means and a list 
of countries are reported in the appendix.    
The equations are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) and two stage least 
squares (2SLS) because the Hausman-Wu test indicates that GDP growth is 
endogenous.  F ollowing Higgins and Williamson (1996, 1997) the rate of growth of 
                                                  
9 See Kinugasa (2004) for additional details.   16
the labor force and the lagged values of the national investment rate, the rate of growth 
of the labor force, the price of investment goods, the price index, real GDP per worker, 
real GDP per capita, and a measure of openness are used as instruments.  All estimates 
include year and regional dummy variables.   
 
Results 
Estimates of the basic model, equation  (1), are presented in Table 3.  OLS and 2SLS 
estimates are both presented and they are generally similar.  We will limit ourselves to 
discussion of the 2SLS results.  Old-age survival consistently has a large, statistically 
significant positive effect on national saving rates for the full sample and for the two 
sub-samples.  The change in survival has a statistically significant positive effect on 
national saving in the West/East Asia (W/EA) sample, but not in the other sub-sample.  
The youth dependency effect is not statistically significant for the full sample or for the 
two sub-samples.  The effect of PRI has a large positive effect in the W/EA and a 
smaller negative effect elsewhere, but the effects are only marginally significant.   
The rate of growth effect evaluated at the mean value of q and D1 is consistently 
positive with a value that ranges from 1.4 in W/EA to 0.75 in the non-W/EA sample.  
An additional result of interest is the substantial East Asian dummy variable coefficient 
in the W/EA analysis.  Rapid increases in adult survival and a high rate of economic 
growth, both characteristic of East Asia, do not fully explain why saving rates are 
higher in East Asia than in the West.   
  The results presented in Table 4 differ from those in Table 3 only in the 
inclusion of the change in the youth dependency effect – designed to capture the 
transitory component of its effect on saving.  We do not find a significant transitory 
effect of youth dependency.  The inclusion of the change in youth dependency had no 
important effect on other aspects of the estimates.  Old-age survival has a strong 
positive effect in all estimates; the change in old-age survival has a positive effect in 
W/EA but not elsewhere.  The effects of other variables are similar to those reported in 
Table 3.   
  Two aspects of the results warrant emphasis.  First, the results imply that the 
demographic transition has had an important effect on aggregate saving rates.  To 
explore this issue, we have projected saving rates using UN projections of mortality and 
the youth dependency ratio.  Projections for the West and East Asia, holding the youth 
dependency ratio and all other variables constant, are presented in Figure 6.  
Projections allowing both the old-age survival ratio and the youth dependency ratio to   17
vary, while holding all other variables constant, are presented in Figure 7.  Values for 
all projections are provided in Appendix Table 2.   
The combined effect of the rise in adult mortality and the decline in youth 
dependency was to increase the aggregate saving rate by 10.5 percentage points in East 
Asia, by 4.1 percentage points in the West, and by 10.4 percentage points in the 
remaining countries based on the 2SLS estimates. Improvements in adult mortality 
accounted for a little more than three-quarters of the increase in each region while the 
decline in the youth dependency ratio accounted for a little less than one-quarter of the 
increase.  These results bridge the gap, to some extent, between recent aggregate level 
analyses that find large demographic effects and the micro-level analysis that find small 
demographic effects.  The combined effects of demographic change are substantial as 
in the aggregate analysis  (Higgins and others, 1997; Kelley and others, 1996).  The age 
structure effects are of similar magnitude to those found by Deaton and Paxson, while 
the effects of longevity would be part of the cohort effect in the Deaton and Paxson 
analysis (Deaton and others, 2000).    
The second important feature of the results is the implication for population 
aging and aggregate saving.  There is widespread concern, though limited empirical 
support, that population aging will lead to a decline in aggregate saving rates.  The 
empirical results presented here do not support that conclusion.  If old-age survival 
rates continue to increase, as is widely expected, our empirical results imply that saving 
rates will continue to rise.  This empirical finding is consistent with the Lee, Mason 
and Miller (2003) simulations and suggests that economic growth may not slow as 
much with population aging as is anticipated in some quarters.   
 
5. RESERVATIONS 
An important unanswered question in this analysis is why no dynamic effect of old-age 
survival is found in the non-W/EA sample.  One possibility is that drawbacks with the 
world panel data are responsible.  The first limitation of the data is its relatively short 
time frame.  For most economic analysis thirty years of data are more than adequate, 
but thirty years is only the length of a single generation.  In a sense, we have a single 
observation of the OLG model presented in Section 2.  The prime age adults/workers 
of 1965 are the old-age population in 1995.   
A second difficulty, discussed in Section 3, is that the 1965-95 period may not 
be well-suited to testing our theoretical saving model.  The countries of the West 
enjoyed similar and relatively constant increases in old-age survival; hence, analyzing 
variation across countries or across time is unlikely to shed much light on the role of   18
increases in old-age survival.  The Asian experience may be more fertile ground to 
analyze as suggested in Section 3.  What about the rest of the developing world?  
Until the mid-1980s the gains in life expectancy were relative constant across the world.  
That the simple correlation between life expectancy at birth for the first half of the 
1960s and the second half of the 1960s was 0.997 for the 176 countries for which the 
UN reports estimates illustrates the point.   
Two groups of countries experienced significant departures from their 
historical trends beginning in the mid-1980s primarily because of two important events 
– the break-up of the Soviet empire and the emergence of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in 
sub-Saharan Africa.  Regional conflicts also played a role in the Middle East and 
Africa.  If the saving model is applicable to these mortality crises, saving rates should 
have declined.  Evidence on this point is limited, but Gregory et al. (1999) conclude 
that the rise of mortality rates among middle-aged Russian men depressed their saving 
rates.          
  A third and related issue is that the measures of mortality in the international 
panel data are not ideal.  Although estimates of life expectancy at birth are reported by 
the World Bank, these values are often based on very incomplete information.  We rely 
on model life tables to transform life expectancy at birth into the old-age survival ratio 
described in the previous section.  Whether this is appropriate in all circumstances and, 
in particular, is reliable under severe mortality crises is a question to which we do not 
have a satisfactory answer.  Moreover, the measure of the speed of mortality decline is 
for five-year periods.  It may be that expectations about increases in old-age survival 
evolve much more slowly.  Perhaps even generation length changes in old-age survival 
– a measure more consistent with our theoretical model – would be more appropriate.   
  It is not our intention to suggest that absence of a dynamic effect in the 
non-W/EA sample must surely be the fault of the data rather than the model.  More 
fundamental explanations are possible.  Higher saving rates are not the only possible 
response to an increase in the number of years lived at old age.  One po ssibility is that 
consumption at old age may decline.  Another is that the elderly may choose to 
increase their labor force participation, although the opposite is the case as an empirical 
matter with the recent exception of the US.  Still another response is that transfer 
systems, either public or familial, may expand to meet the needs of a growing elderly 
population.  Further work on these topics is clearly needed.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
This is not the first paper to conclude that the increased duration of life could lead to 
higher saving rates.  At the individual or household level, it is obvious that higher 
saving rates are a likely response to an increased duration of retirement.  The effect on 
aggregate saving is more complex, however, because there are both behavioral 
responses and age composition effects at play.  An important contribution of this paper 
is to show that the aggregate saving rate depends on both the level and the rate at which 
adult survival is increasing.   
The empirical results provide strong and consistent evidence that an increase in 
the portion of adult life lived at old ages leads to an increase in saving rates.  This 
finding holds for all samples and specifications.  The historical evidence suggests and 
the international panel data confirms that the increase in adult survival was a major 
impetus to the rise in the wealth of many nations. 
The evidence for the dynamic effect, i.e., the effect of the rate of change in 
old-age survival, is more fragile.  When analysis is confined to the West/East Asia 
sample we find a statistically significant effect.  Moreover, the long-run historical 
patterns available for countries from East Asia and the West are consistent with the 
dynamic effect.  In other parts of the contemporary developing world, however, we do 
not find any support for a dynamic effect.   
There are two additional important implications of the empirical analysis.  The 
first is that the demographic transition had a strong positive effect on aggregate saving 
rates, but that most of the effect was a response to improvements in old-age survival 
rather than to changes in youth dependency.  This result may help to reconcile the 
divergent findings of studies based on the analysis of aggregate data and household 
survey data.  The second important implication is that population aging will not lead to 
a decline in saving rates.  Any compositional effects associated with population aging 
are outweighed by the behavioral effects of continued increases in longevity.    20
Appendix 1 National Saving Rate in a Closed Economy  
A greater survival rate brings capital deepening ( ** /0 kq ¶¶> ). If GDP growth 
rate is greater than the deprecation rate, the saving rate increases. If GDP is growing at a 
rate less than the rate of depreciation, an increase in q
* has a negative effect on the 
saving rate.   
The effect of the national saving rate of a one-time, anticipated increase of the 











.  An anticipated increase in the survival rate at 
time t leads to a higher national saving rate. At time t, saving of prime-age adults 
increases, which causes an increase in kt+1. The supply of capital increases and the 
saving rate increases. The effect of an increase in the survival rate at time t on the 
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where 21 0/1 tt kk ++ <¶¶<   and  1 /0 tt kq + ¶¶>  hold. For plausible parameter values, this 
expression is negative. The saving at time t+1 is the difference between the wealth at 
time t+2 and t+1. An increase in qt induces capital deepening at time t+1, but the wealth 
of the previous period and depreciation are also higher than at time t. The net increase in 
wealth at time t+1 is less than that at time t. In a closed economy, the survival rate at 
time t also influences the saving rate at time t+2. This stands in contrast to the case of 
small open economy. The survival rate at time t has a negative effect on the saving rate 
after time t+2.
10 























32 0/1 tt kk ++ <¶¶< , 
21 0/1 tt kk ++ <¶¶< , 
and 
1 /0 tt kq + ¶¶>  hold, therefore, in the right hand side of   this equation, the value inside the bracket 
is negative for plausible parameters, so that the saving rate at time t has a negative effect on the  saving 
rate at time t+2. In the same way, the effects of the survival rate at time t on the saving rate after time t+2 
can be derived. qt has a negative effect on the saving rate after time t+2.   21
Appendix 2  List of Countries 
Western countries contain Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Belarus, 
Canada, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United 
Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Moldova, Macedonia, Netherlands, Norway, New 
Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Tajikistan, 
Turkey, Ukraine, and United States. East Asian countries contain Japan, South Korea, 
Thailand and Malaysia.   
  Other countries contain Angola, Burundi, Benin, Burkina Faso, Botswana, 
Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Comoros, Cape 
Verde, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Mauritania, Mauritius, Malawi, Namibia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Seychelles, Chad, Togo, Tanzania, 
Uganda, South Africa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia and Zimbabwe,  
Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, Macao, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Argentina, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Barbados, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, El Salvador, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadine, Venezuela, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
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0.9251 0.9587 0.9471 0.9585 0.9872 0.9944 0.9628
N 252 158 129 48 59 43 20
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
D.W. 0.5765 0.7026 0.397 0.0958 0.3897 0.3651 0.0338
years
 
(Note) Dependent variables are adult survival index except India. The dependent variable for India is life 
expectancy at age 30. The equation  ()() 01211322 bbbbe =++-+-+ qtdttdtt tt  is estimated, 
where 1if 11 dtt =‡ and 0 otherwise, and d2=1 if  2 tt ‡ and 0 otherwise. Dm1773 is dummy variable of 
year 1773=1. In the same way, Dm1808, Dm1918 are defined. N is  number  of observations.  “ P-value” is 
the p-value of F-test for the null hypothesis that ß1 , ß2, and ß3 are all zero. D.W. is Durbin-Watson 
statistics.  The low  Durbin-Watson statistics imply serial correlation. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
indicates that some variables are not trend stationary. These issues will be explored further.  
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Table 2 Mean National Saving Rates in Pre-Transition and Transition Periods. 
    Sweden  
United 
Kingdom    Italy  
United 
States   Japan   Taiwan   India
a) 
Pre-transition  1751-1875  1841-1899  <1872  <1900  1891-1947  1906-1939  1900-1950 
Survival rate   0.31   0.34   na  na  0.35    0.24    24.0  
Saving rate  7.3  11.6  na  na  15.7  22.1  6.9 
               
Transition  1876-2000  1900-1998  1872-2000  1900-2001  1947-2000  1940-1999  1951-1997 
Survival rate   0.53   0.49   0.47   0.57   0.60    0.54    37.7  
Saving rate  16.6  13  17.7  17.7  32.6  26.1  17.7 
(Note) Life expectancy at age 30 is presented instead of survival rate in India. 
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Table 3 Estimated Saving Equation with Old-Age Survival Index and Youth Dependency 
(1) Whole World (2) West and  East Asia (3) Non-West, Non East Asia








(1.8606) (2.6660) (3.7148) (3.5266) (1.9979) (2.9857)
dq 0.8615 0.5104 1.7954
** 1.8115
** 0.3284 -0.2538
(0.5266) (0.5752) (0.8192) (0.8519) (0.5962) (0.6823)
D1*Ygr 0.7461 0.9319 -3.0912
*** -1.7057 0.4379 1.0155














(0.0032) (0.0036) (0.0207) (0.0212) (0.0035) (0.0036)
y70 0.0100 0.0075 0.0093 0.0105 0.0069 0.0026
(0.0181) (0.0184) (0.0161) (0.0159) (0.0251) (0.0253)
y75 -0.0175 -0.0253 -0.0280
* -0.0250 -0.0261 -0.0373
(0.0166) (0.0176) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0233) (0.0241)
y80 -0.0253 -0.0290 -0.0280 -0.0167 -0.0433
* -0.0543
**
(0.0165) (0.0188) (0.0198) (0.0238) (0.0222) (0.0234)
y85 -0.0031 -0.0013 0.0001 0.0184 -0.0272 -0.0345
(0.0163) (0.0218) (0.0173) (0.0207) (0.0226) (0.0272)
y90 -0.0102 -0.0185 -0.0340
* -0.0255 -0.0258 -0.0398
(0.0161) (0.0197) (0.0175) (0.0191) (0.0225) (0.0257)
y95 -0.0009 -0.0086 -0.0039 0.0196 -0.0339 -0.0598 **

















(0.0161) (0.0245) (0.0247) (0.0306) (0.0205) (0.0305)
N 566 566 189 189 377 377
Adjusted R 0.4357 0.3945 0.4191 0.3848 0.1275 0.0852
P-values, Ygr 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pvalues,
year 0.2800 0.1160 0.0125 0.0006 0.2261 0.0954
Y gr Effect 0.7203 1.1739 0.6967 1.4105 0.6177 0.7543
P-value,
Hausman 0.0000 0.0037 0.0000
 
     
Note: The dependent variable is the national saving rat e.   
q: Adult survival index, Ygr: GDP growth rate, D1: young dependency rate, ?q: change in the adult 
survival rate, PRI : price of investment goods, yXX dummy variables of year XX, N: number of 
observation. “P-value, Ygr ” is the p-value of F-test of the n ull hypothesis that the both coefficients of 
q·Ygr and D1·Ygr are zero. “Pvalue,  year dummies” is the  p-value of F-test of the null hypothesis that all 
the year dummies are zero. “  Ygr Effect” is the partial effect of an increase in GDP growth. 
*** denotes significant at 1 % level, **denotes significant at 5 % level, and * denotes 
significant at 10 % level. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.   
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Table  4 Estimated Saving Equation with Old-Age Survival Index , Youth Dependency Ratio, 
and Change in Youth Dependency Ratio. 
(1) Whole World (2) West and  East Asia (3) Non-West, Non East Asia













(1.9440) (2.6829) (3.7186) (3.5232) (2.1327) (3.0590)





(0.5219) (0.5917) (0.8029) (0.8247) (0.5895) (0.6847)
D 1*Ygr 0.7615 0.8210 -3.0871
***
-1.6881 0.7026 0.9864
(0.7684) (0.9166) (1.1214) (1.1255) (1.0056) (1.3233)
dD1 -0.1753 0.0543 -0.0373 -0.0186 -0.2402 -0.0387











(1.3817) (1.9559) (2.4665) (2.3938) (1.6018) (2.4076)








(0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0207) (0.0210) (0.0036) (0.0036)
y70 0.0066 0.0084 0.0090 0.0103 0.0010 0.0016
(0.0183) (0.0186) (0.0164) (0.0161) (0.0257) (0.0257)
y75 -0.0234 -0.0238 -0.0289
*
-0.0255 -0.0353 -0.0389
(0.0167) (0.0180) (0.0173) (0.0177) (0.0236) (0.0248)
y80 -0.0331
** -0.0272 -0.0292 -0.0176 -0.0546
*** -0.0564
**
(0.0169) (0.0195) (0.0222) (0.0267) (0.0229) (0.0241)
y85 -0.0105 -0.0001 -0.0012 0.0172 -0.0372
*
-0.0370
(0.0168) (0.0226) (0.0196) (0.0243) (0.0232) (0.0281)





(0.0164) (0.0202) (0.0186) (0.0209) (0.0235) (0.0268)





























(0.0162) (0.0246) (0.0249) (0.0311) (0.0214) (0.0309)
N 566 566 189 189 377 377
Adjusted R
2
0.4373 0.3897 0.4160 0.3822 0.1298 0.0856
P-values, Ygr 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000
Pvalues, year
dummies 0.1703 0.1466 0.0144 0.0007 0.0873 0.0815
Ygr Effect 0.6821 1.1621 0.6951 1.3976 0.5767 0.7133
P-value,
Hausman 0.0000 0.0033 0.0000
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Appendix Table 1 Summary of the Variables 
Total 1965 1970
Variable N Mean Standard
Deviation N Mean Standard
Deviation N Mean Standard
Deviation
S/Y 566 0.1279 0.1211 76 0.1355 0.1369 76 0.1462 0.1300
Y gr 566 0.0387 0.0318 76 0.0548 0.0315 76 0.0510 0.0240
q 566 0.4816 0.1004 76 0.4380 0.0977 76 0.4503 0.0960
dq 566 0.0126 0.0097 76 0.0140 0.0066 76 0.0134 0.0068
D1 566 0.6646 0.2374 76 0.7230 0.2137 76 0.7202 0.2170
dD1 566 -0.0151 0.0417 76 0.0191 0.0370 76 -0.0003 0.0336
PRI 566 0.8473 0.7492 76 0.7143 0.6090 76 0.8310 0.8267
D 566 0.4938 0.5182 76 0.2667 0.3829 76 0.3185 0.4234
dD 566 0.0678 0.0778 76 0.0197 0.0511 76 0.0518 0.0774
1975 1980 1985






S/Y 76 0.1261 0.1114 78 0.1140 0.1152 81 0.1241 0.1168
Y gr 76 0.0481 0.0270 78 0.0418 0.0344 81 0.0252 0.0319
q 76 0.4686 0.0955 78 0.4846 0.0960 81 0.4959 0.0961
dq 76 0.0147 0.0072 78 0.0149 0.0081 81 0.0143 0.0069
D1 76 0.6963 0.2258 78 0.6644 0.2326 81 0.6466 0.2440
dD1 76 -0.0173 0.0406 78 -0.0267 0.0453 81 -0.0221 0.0427
PRI 76 1.0199 1.3963 78 0.8903 0.7807 81 0.7923 0.3353
D 76 0.4139 0.4803 78 0.5010 0.5106 81 0.5596 0.5406







S/Y 85 0.1256 0.1142 94 0.1257 0.1235
Y gr 85 0.0335 0.0219 94 0.0219 0.0332
q 85 0.5104 0.0949 94 0.5119 0.1034
dq 85 0.0119 0.0108 94 0.0067 0.0144
D1 85 0.6232 0.2486 94 0.5996 0.2500
dD1 85 -0.0245 0.0307 94 -0.0287 0.0392
PRI 85 0.8623 0.4620 94 0.8264 0.3861
D 85 0.6337 0.5393 94 0.6946 0.5638
dD 85 0.0759 0.0776 94 0.0835 0.0750
Western and East Asian Countries Other Countries
Variable N Mean Standard
Deviation N Mean Standard
Deviation
S/Y 189 0.2295 0.0711 377 0.0770 0.1082
Y gr 189 0.0395 0.0280 377 0.0383 0.0335
q 189 0.5779 0.0487 377 0.4333 0.0834
dq 189 0.0122 0.0075 377 0.0128 0.0106
D1 189 0.3992 0.1405 377 0.7976 0.1473
dD1 189 -0.0253 0.0305 377 -0.0099 0.0455
PRI 189 0.7983 0.2404 377 0.8718 0.9015
D 189 1.0653 0.3641 377 0.2073 0.3013
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Appendix Table 2 Adult Survival Index and Projected National Sa ving Rate  
(1) West and East Asia Projected National Saving Rate
Means of the variables Constant D1 Changing D1
q dq D1 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
1950 0.4972 0.4715
1955 0.5193 0.0220 0.4852 0.2059 0.1997 0.2274 0.2115
1960 0.5349 0.0157 0.4972 0.1996 0.1972 0.2196 0.2082
1965 0.5450 0.0101 0.4854 0.1929 0.1928 0.2143 0.2047
1970 0.5579 0.0128 0.4626 0.2019 0.2051 0.2261 0.2185
1975 0.5718 0.0139 0.4348 0.2084 0.2152 0.2359 0.2303
1980 0.5844 0.0126 0.4015 0.2101 0.2199 0.2416 0.2373
1985 0.5961 0.0117 0.3654 0.2123 0.2251 0.2481 0.2448
1990 0.6077 0.0116 0.3358 0.2158 0.2315 0.2552 0.2532
1995 0.6198 0.0121 0.3147 0.2207 0.2393 0.2625 0.2624
2000 0.6306 0.0108 0.2924 0.2218 0.2431 0.2663 0.2676
2005 0.6413 0.0108 0.2714 0.2253 0.2493 0.2723 0.2752
2010 0.6513 0.0100 0.2527 0.2271 0.2535 0.2763 0.2807
2015 0.6605 0.0092 0.2447 0.2287 0.2574 0.2789 0.2851
2020 0.6691 0.0086 0.2410 0.2304 0.2613 0.2811 0.2893
2025 0.6772 0.0080 0.2419 0.2320 0.2649 0.2826 0.2928
2030 0.6849 0.0077 0.2454 0.2340 0.2688 0.2841 0.2964
2035 0.6924 0.0075 0.2497 0.2359 0.2725 0.2855 0.2999
2040 0.6997 0.0073 0.2536 0.2380 0.2765 0.2871 0.3036
2045 0.7069 0.0071 0.2572 0.2400 0.2803 0.2887 0.3072
(2) Non-West, Non East Asia Projected National Saving Rate
Means of the variables Non-West, Non East Asia
q dq D1 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
1950 0.3716 0.7424
1955 0.3894 0.0178 0.7717 0.0807 0.0728 0.0716 0.0591
1960 0.4055 0.0161 0.8066 0.0858 0.0830 0.0775 0.0704
1965 0.4213 0.0158 0.8368 0.0913 0.0927 0.0834 0.0811
1970 0.4359 0.0146 0.8434 0.0961 0.1019 0.0890 0.0907
1975 0.4504 0.0145 0.8348 0.1012 0.1107 0.0949 0.1001
1980 0.4656 0.0152 0.8220 0.1068 0.1198 0.0997 0.1092
1985 0.4802 0.0146 0.8069 0.1117 0.1289 0.1038 0.1173
1990 0.4863 0.0061 0.7859 0.1111 0.1347 0.1029 0.1220
1995 0.4911 0.0047 0.7513 0.1123 0.1379 0.1014 0.1227
2000 0.4956 0.0045 0.7103 0.1139 0.1408 0.1013 0.1220
2005 0.5040 0.0085 0.6715 0.1181 0.1449 0.1053 0.1236
2010 0.5153 0.0112 0.6345 0.1230 0.1510 0.1100 0.1281
2015 0.5270 0.0117 0.5984 0.1273 0.1580 0.1138 0.1338
2020 0.5388 0.0118 0.5600 0.1316 0.1652 0.1178 0.1399
2025 0.5516 0.0127 0.5198 0.1363 0.1727 0.1224 0.1464
2030 0.5640 0.0124 0.4808 0.1406 0.1804 0.1266 0.1533
2035 0.5759 0.0119 0.4444 0.1446 0.1877 0.1306 0.1601
2040 0.5872 0.0113 0.4122 0.1485 0.1948 0.1343 0.1667
2045 0.5978 0.0106 0.3848 0.1520 0.2014 0.1378 0.1731
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Appendix Table 2 Adult Survival Index and Projected National Saving Rate   (Continued) 
(3) West Projected National Saving Rate
Means of the variables Constant D1 Changing D1
q dq D1 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
1950 0.5108 0.4334
1955 0.5322 0.0214 0.4511 0.2091 0.2060 0.2346 0.2201
1960 0.5468 0.0146 0.4612 0.2015 0.2020 0.2259 0.2154
1965 0.5552 0.0084 0.4467 0.1931 0.1956 0.2192 0.2100
1970 0.5658 0.0106 0.4260 0.2006 0.2057 0.2291 0.2215
1975 0.5787 0.0129 0.4040 0.2087 0.2171 0.2399 0.2343
1980 0.5899 0.0112 0.3767 0.2094 0.2206 0.2438 0.2396
1985 0.6003 0.0105 0.3444 0.2114 0.2252 0.2497 0.2463
1990 0.6111 0.0107 0.3208 0.2154 0.2318 0.2565 0.2545
1995 0.6228 0.0117 0.3026 0.2210 0.2404 0.2643 0.2643
2000 0.6331 0.0103 0.2823 0.2217 0.2436 0.2674 0.2688
2005 0.6431 0.0101 0.2612 0.2246 0.2490 0.2729 0.2757
2010 0.6524 0.0092 0.2441 0.2261 0.2528 0.2764 0.2805
2015 0.6610 0.0086 0.2381 0.2278 0.2567 0.2788 0.2848
2020 0.6692 0.0082 0.2363 0.2297 0.2606 0.2810 0.2889
2025 0.6769 0.0077 0.2363 0.2313 0.2641 0.2825 0.2924
2030 0.6844 0.0075 0.2429 0.2334 0.2681 0.2839 0.2959
2035 0.6917 0.0072 0.2478 0.2352 0.2717 0.2851 0.2992
2040 0.6988 0.0071 0.2521 0.2373 0.2756 0.2866 0.3028
2045 0.7058 0.0070 0.2562 0.2395 0.2795 0.2883 0.3064
(4) East Asia Projected National Saving Rate
Constant D1 Changing D1
q dq D1 OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
1950 0.3429 0.7190
1955 0.3596 0.0167 0.7066 0.18540 0.15826 0.1804 0.1555
1960 0.3755 0.0158 0.7406 0.18712 0.16557 0.1780 0.1606
1965 0.3909 0.0154 0.7466 0.19127 0.17497 0.1815 0.1696
1970 0.4064 0.0155 0.7098 0.21062 0.20115 0.2052 0.1982
1975 0.4227 0.0163 0.6426 0.20667 0.20234 0.2093 0.2038
1980 0.4380 0.0153 0.5687 0.21482 0.21591 0.2263 0.2222
1985 0.4517 0.0137 0.5070 0.21825 0.22428 0.2371 0.2347
1990 0.4575 0.0057 0.4367 0.21889 0.22918 0.2462 0.2442
1995 0.4590 0.0016 0.3959 0.21863 0.23247 0.2508 0.2502
2000 0.4606 0.0016 0.3583 0.22235 0.23968 0.2590 0.2599
2005 0.4682 0.0076 0.3377 0.22959 0.25075 0.2687 0.2723
2010 0.4796 0.0114 0.3086 0.23363 0.25848 0.2762 0.2820
2015 0.4916 0.0121 0.2871 0.23426 0.26229 0.2794 0.2872
2020 0.5042 0.0126 0.2717 0.23496 0.26577 0.2820 0.2917
2025 0.5181 0.0138 0.2642 0.23666 0.27003 0.2845 0.2965
2030 0.5319 0.0138 0.2619 0.23742 0.27304 0.2856 0.2996
2035 0.5452 0.0133 0.2617 0.24008 0.27793 0.2883 0.3045
2040 0.5579 0.0127 0.2632 0.24239 0.28241 0.2904 0.3089
2045 0.5698 0.0119 0.2636 0.24341 0.28537 0.2914 0.3118
 